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Reviews
The Review Section of Ethics & Animals consists of three parts.
The first
is made up of brief reviews of books and articles (and perhaps films, etc.)
which are concerned in some way with the rights and wrongs of human treat
ment of non-human animals.
These reviews wilt be both critical and reportive 
primarily reportive in the case of most sclentifiL: and llistorical
llistoric:al material,
and increasingly critical as the material is more argumentative and philoso
phical.
The second part of this Section is entitled 'Second Opinion' and
contains second (and usually dissenting) reviews of works reviewed in the
first part in earlier numbers of Ethics & Animals. After a review appears
in Ethics & Animals (and after the 'Second Opinion' if one appears within
the next two numbers), the Editor will invite the author of the original
work to submit a brief rejoinder to the review(s).
Rejoinders received will
appear in the third part of the Review Section. Members of the SSEA who wish
to submit reviews (first or second), or recommend works for review, should
contact the Editor.

Tom Regan, "The Natu re and Pos
sibility of an Environmental Ethic,"
Environmental Ethics, Vol. 3, No.1,
Spring, 981
This valuable article contributes to
discussions of the possibility, neces
sity and nature of an environmental
ethic primarily by clearing away some
(philosophical) underbrush, planting
some seeds and indicating the kinds of
fruit that need to be grown. . An
"environmental ethic," according to
Regan, is one that accords moral
standing not only to non-humans, but
to non-conscious objects, as well.
The two kinds of underbrush impeding
the growth of such an ethic are argu
ments purporting to show that it is
impossible, and others purporting to
show that it is unnecessary.
Regan considers three arguments of
the first kind.
Each is basically of
the form: Z is necessary for a being
to have moral standing and non-con
scious objects lack Z, so they can not

have moral standing. An environmen
tal ethic which accords them moral
standi ng is therefore impossible.
In
these arguments Z is either sentience,
having a good of one's own or having
interests.
Regan does not show any
of these arguments to be unsound,
but rejects all three because each has
at least one problematic premise.
He turns next to four arguments
purporting to show that because other
ethical principles suffice to prescribe
appropriate behavior toward the envi
ronment, an environmental ethic (one
attributing moral standing to non-con
scious objects) is unnecessary. 1) He
rejects the argument based upon the
claim that brutality toward the envi
ronment leads to brutality toward fel
low human beings.
2) He points out
that the ideal of non -destructiveness
does not replace, but presupposes an
environmental ethic. 3) Utilitarianism
does
not
protect
non -conscious
environmental objects because a grow
ing percentage of people are increas
ingly pleased by Disneyland and plas
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tic trees rather than real redwoods.
4) Cultural ideals do not suffice to
protect the envi ronment because they
differ from culture to culture and
change over time.
So a specifically
environmental ethic is necessary if the
envi ronment is to be adequately pro
protected from people.
I n the cou rse of clearing away this
underbrush, Regan plants some seeds.
The fi rst is his defi nition of an en vi ronment ethic. I n addition, there are
his views that to have moral standing,
non-conscious
envi ronmental objects
must have inherent value independent
of any conscious being's appreciation
of it, which (value) must be an objec
objective property of the object that is

consequent upon the object's other
objective properties. And the proper
attitude toward such an object is
admiring respect, which should lead
one to promote its preservation.
Regan ends with two questions that
a fruitful theory must answer: what
makes something inherently good, and
how can we know which things are
inherently good? This helpful article
clarifies the issues with which it deals
and prepares the ground for further
work in the area.
Peter S. Wenz
Sangamon State University
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